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IF A REGULATION FALLS IN THE COURTS, AND NOBODY'S THERE TO
HEAR IT ... THE LIMITED IMPACT OF NORTHWESTENViRONMENTAL
ADVOCATES V. EPA ON FEDERAL BALLAST WATER POLICY
Northwest Environmental Advocates v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Congress, acting under pressure to address the
increasingly destructive pollution of America's waterways, passed the first
incarnation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in part to protect the
,2
"biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Among the CWA's
requirements is that no person be allowed to discharge pollutants into the
water except by an Enivornmental Protection Agency ("EPA") permit. 3
One issue involved with this obligation has caused particular tension
between environmentalists and the regulators charged with issuing
permits: the status of ballast water. Ballast water is water taken on or
released by cargo ships to balance gains and losses in weight as fuel and
cargo is added or released. Because ballast water is essential to the safety
of cargo ships, and because it was once thought to have little
environmental impact, it has been excluded from the permit process by
EPA regulation since 1973. 4 But ballast water has since been found to
have a calamitous effect on the native ecosystems into which it is
discharged and is estimated to cause billions of dollars in damages through
537 F.3d 1006 (9f Cir. 2008).
2 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
3 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1972). The EPA, through the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) oversees the approval or denial of permits. Nw. Envtl.
Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 537 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 33
U.S.C. § 1342). Permits can be categorized as either individual or general. Nw. Envtl.
Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1010 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 279 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002)). Individual permits allow particular
individuals or organizations to release pollutants in a specified location. Id. General
permits "are issued for an entire class of hypothetical dischargers in a given geographical
region." Id. at 1011.
4 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) (1973).
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the release of nonindigenous aquatic species accidentally transported to
new ecosystems by ballast tanks from other areas of the world.
Unsatisfied with Coast Guard and state regulations already in
place, 6 environmentalists sued to force the EPA to oversee ballast water
transfers through the permit process for the discharge of other pollutants.7
The 9th Circuit sided with the environmentalists, finding that the CWA
mandated EPA regulation of ballast water and that agency action to the
contrary violated the spirit of the statutory permit requirement. But for
those who advocate increased regulation of ballast water, the decision may
have a limited impact as Congress moves to pass a law that would put
ballast water regulation under the exclusive control of the Coast Guard
and possibly blunt the impact of state restrictions.9 The court in this case
probably did not break a great deal of new legal ground, but its decision,
especially its reaffirmation of an extremely high standard for finding
congressional acquiescence to regulatory bodies, may well have an impact
on future congressional decision-making.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Among the CWA's requirements is that no person be allowed to
discharge pollutants except by an EPA permit.' 0 Nonetheless, ballast
s Brent C. Foster, Pollutants without Half-Lives: The Role ofFederal Environmental
Laws in Controlling Ballast Water Discharges ofExotic Species, 30 ENVTL. L. 99, 99
(2000).
6 "The Coast Guard regulations ... require that any ship with ballast water tanks that
enters United States waters from beyond 200 miles of the coastline engage in certain
practices designed to minimize [aquatic nuisance species] introduction." Loren
Remsberg. Too Many Cooks in the Galley: Overlapping Agency Jurisdiction ofBallast
Water Regulation. 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1412, 1419 (2008) (citing 33 C.F.R. §
151.2035(b) (2004)).
7 Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1013.
'Id. at 1021.
9 Dan Egan. Conservation Groups Warn ofHole in Ballast Water Bill. MLWAUKEE
JOURNAL-SENTINEL, July 25, 2008,
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=776605.
1o 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1972). The EPA, through the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) oversees the approval or denial of permits. Nw. Envtl.
Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1010 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342). Permits can be categorized as
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water and other ship discharges were not of primary concern to the EPA
when it went about promulgating regulations to compliment the CWA in
the early 1970s." Following its passage, the EPA promulgated regulations
addressing the enforcement of the CWA's provisions.12 One such
regulation freed from the permit requirement the discharge of "sewage
from vessels, effluent from properly functioning marine engines, laundry,
shower, and galley sink wastes, or any other discharge incidental to the
normal operation of a vessel."l 3 These regulations effectively exempted
unburned fuel, oil, certain bacteria, ammonia, arsenic, copper, lead, nickel,
zinc, and other pollutants.14 The exemptions also applied to ballast
water.' 5 Because ballast water can contain organisms from various
ecosystems, it can be particularly harmful to native populations of wildlife
into which it is released.' 6 These invasive species also cost an estimated
$137 billion each year in economic losses.17
either individual or general. Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1010 (citing Natural Res.
Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 279 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9 1h Cir. 2002)).
Individual permits allow particular individuals or organizations to release pollutants in a
specified location. Id. General permits "are issued for an entire class of hypothetical
dischargers in a given geographical region." Id. at 1011.
11 "[The EPA was] faced with many, many other much higher priority situations such as
raw sewage being discharged, municipal plants having to be built, very large paper mills
or steel mills and the like discharging. At the time we thought that was not an important
area to deal with." Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1011 (quoting Craig Voght, EPA,
EPA Pub. Meeting #12227, Ocean Discharge Criteria (Sept. 12, 2000, 1p.m.)).
1 2 id.
13 EPA Administered Permit Programs: the National Pollutant Discharge System, 40
C.F.R. § 122.3(a) (1973). Sewage discharges were already exempt from the permitting
process under the CWA, but the other three exceptions were crafted by the EPA through
this regulation. Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1011. The EPA exempted these
discharges largely to reduce administrative costs. Id. (citing 38 Fed. Reg.
13,528(b)(13)(ii) (Jan. 11, 1973)).
14 Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1012.
" Id. (citing Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2006 WL 2669042 (N.D.
Cal. 2006)).
1 Id. One example of the invasive species phenomenon is the zebra mussel, which had
been native to Asia, but after being transported to America in ballast water is now
common in the Great Lakes and their tributaries. Id. Zebra mussel have been known to
starve native populations of fish and other animals where they exist in North America by
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In 1999, Northwest Environmental Advocates, San Francisco
Baykeeper, and the Ocean Conservancy, environmental groups concerned
primarily with the regulation of ballast water, petitioned the EPA to
rescind 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) on the grounds that it contradicted the
statute.' 8 The EPA initially ignored the petition, and the environmental
groups sued, alleging unreasonable delay. 19 Facing an order from the
district court to make a decision on the petition, the EPA consented to do
so by September 2, 2003.20 After prolonged silence on the issue, the EPA
denied the petition and the environmental groups brought suit in the
Northern District of California.21
The plaintiffs contended that the CWA did not allow the regulation
excepting certain discharges from the permit requirement because the
statute clearly prohibited any discharge of almost any pollution except by
permit. 22 The EPA countered on several fronts, arguing that the district
court had no jurisdiction, that the statute of limitations had run, and that
Congress had impliedly acquiesced to the regulation by its inaction over
the three decades it had been in force.23 In granting summary judgment for
the environmental groups, the district court agreed with their contention
that the regulation ran counter to the clear intent of the statute and was
thus ultra vires.24 It rejected the argument that Congress had acquiesced to
the regulation, noting that "overwhelming evidence" is required to hold
eating through algae and other food sources. Zebra Mussels,
http://www.gma.org/surfing/human/zebra.html.17 Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1012. (citing Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 2006 WL
2669042).
" Id. at 1013.
9 Id.
20 Id. (citing Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, F.3d 853, 857 ( 9 th Cir.
2003).
21 Id. at 1013-14. The plaintiffs also filed directly with the 9th Circuit in the event that the
court should have decided it had original jurisdiction pursuant to jurisdictional
P rovisions. Id. at 1014.
Id. The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the EPA's decision on their petition was
"not in accordance with law." Id.23 Id. at 1015.
24 24 Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2005 WL 756614, 9 (N.D. Cal.
2005)..
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that Congress has accepted a regulation that appears to contradict a
statute.25
During the remedy stage, several Great Lakes stateS26 intervened
as plaintiffs and the Shipping Industry Ballast Water Coalition, a private
interest group, intervened as a defendant. 27 The district court vacated the
regulation effective September 30, 2008,28 at which time the defendants
appealed the ruling to the 9 th Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate court
held in a unanimous decision that the plaintiffs filed their complaint in a
timely manner, that 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) was promulgated in excess of
authority granted to the EPA by the CWA, and that, despite
acknowledging its existence, Congress had not acquiesced to the
regulation's clear divergence from the spirit and letter of the law. 29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The CWA mandates that "[tihe discharge of any pollutant bZ any
person shall be unlawful" except where allowed by EPA permit. o By
regulation, the EPA excluded certain discharges, including ballast water,
from the permit process despite being allowed no such power by statute. 3 1
Environmental advocates have often clashed with the EPA on similar
regulations in the past, with courts generally siding in favor of the
environmental advocates on issues such as the interpretation of statutes of
limitation, Chevron analysis of potentially ultra vires regulation and
alleged Congressional acquiescence to administrative authority.
25 Id. at 12.
26 Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin intervened. Id.
at 9.27 id.
28 id.
29 Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1022.
3o 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1972).
3 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a).
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A. Statute ofLimitations
By law, civil actions against the United States government must be
filed within six years of the accrual of the action. 32 The rule is deceivingly
unambiguous, because while the date of accrual is often clear in tort cases,
for example, it is not always as obvious when dealing with environmental
regulation and administrative action. 33 Does the action accrue when a
regulation is promulgated, when it is challenged administratively, or when
administrative proceedings are completed? 34
Contrary to other circuits, the 9th Circuit had historically expressed
worry that endorsing a broad interpretation of the statute would essentially
negate its pui ose. 35 In Shiny Rock Mining Corporation v. US., for
example, the 9t Circuit held that an action accrues for the plaintiff as soon
as an injury to any person or group becomes apparent. 36 In its analysis, the
court reasoned that a broader interpretation would allow an action to be
filed every time an agency rejected a petition for abolition of a regulation,
regardless of whether such challenges had been rebuffed by the court in
the past.3 The court adopted the position that implementation "of [the
plaintiffs] rationale would virtually nullify the statute of limitations for
challenges to agency orders." 38 An absence of direction from the Supreme
Court eventually led to a circuit split on this issue, with other circuits
mostly taking the opposing position.
3 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1978). The purpose of statutes of limitation is to "suppress
fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time." 54 C.J.S.
Limitations ofActions § 2 (2008).
3 See Wind River Min. Corp. v. U.S., 946 F.2d 710, 713-14 (9 1h Cir. 1991).
34 id.
3s See Shiny Rock Min. Corp. v. U.S., 906 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9t Cir. 1990).
36 id.
37 Id.
38 Id. See also Sierra Club v. Penfold 857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9" Cir. 1988) (holding that
where procedural issues are challenged, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as
injury becomes apparent).
39 5ee Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. ICC, 720 F.2d 958, 961 (7t' Cir. 1983) (holding that
the statute of limitations does not begin to run upon the promulgation of a regulation if
"no one had any reason to challenge the decision at the time it was made"). See also, e.g.,
Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., 901 F.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
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But the 9 th Circuit reversed course only a year after its Shiny Rock
decision in Wind River Mining Corporation v. U.S., finding that for the
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), a civil action accrues when a final ruling
is made on a challenge to administrative rules or regulations. 40 When the
challenge deals with an agency overreaching its authority, the 9th Circuit
held that a party is allowed to file a complaint with the agency, and, if
denied, is allowed to sue at any time up to six years after the final
41disposition.
In some circumstances, it is difficult to tell when an agency
decision is final in terms of the statute. An action is final when it marks
the end of the decision-making process on the part of the agency.42 It must
also be an action by which "rights or obligations have been determined,"
or from which "legal consequences will flow." 43 A mere recommendation
cannot be a final decision in terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).44
B. Ultra Vires Challenges and Chevron 45
Congress has charged the courts with the responsibility of deciding
when an agency action is outside the bounds of statutory authority.46 The
court must invalidate any statute that is "in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right."4 7 When an agency
does exceed its legislative mandate, the judiciary must step in and put it
(holding that, on issues of substance rather than procedure, the statute of limitations does
not run until a final agency action).
40 946 F.2d 710, 716 (citing Crown Coat Front Co. v. U.S., 386 U.S. 503, 511 (1967)).
41 Wind River Min. Corp., 946 F.2d at 714; see also Oppenheim v. Coleman, 571 F.2d
660, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that when the plaintiff "seeks to set aside recent
arbitrary agency action" based on an ultra vires regulation, the statute of limitations
begins to expire only after the plaintiff challenges that action).
42 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)). The decision "must not be
merely tentative or interlocutory in nature." Id. at 178.
43 Id. (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
"Id.
45 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
46 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1966).
47 Id.
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back on course.48 In the landmark case Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court had to decide the validity
of the EPA's interpretation of a clause in the Clean Air Act requiring an
agency permit for individuals or corporations to operate new sources of air
pollution. 49 The court laid out a simple two-part test for determining a
regulation's legitimacy. First, the court must decide whether Congess
statutorily expressed its intention on the exact issue in question. o If
Congress has done so, the inquiry ends and the unambiguous statutory
intent controls.5 ' If Congress has not done so, then the court must decide
whether the agency's interpretation is acceptable. 52 If the statute has
implicitly given an agency the authority to disseminate ambiguities, then
reasonable agency interpretation must be allowed to stand, but if the
interpretation is not reasonable, the court may strike down the regulation
in question.5 3 Naturally, it is in the best interest of any agency to adhere
closely to Congressional intent, lest it risk judicial interference. 4
But in recent years, the court has found ambiguity even in the
simplicity of Chevron-style deference to agency interpretation." In
Christensen, for example, the court held that agency decisions lacking
force of law "do not warrant Chevron-style deference," and instead should
be entitled to respect only so long as they are persuasive interpretations of
statutory ambiguities.56 But in his concurrence, Justice Scalia wrote that
agencies should continue to enjoy the wide deference laid out in Chevron
regardless of the format of their interpretations because "[t]he power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to
48 James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the F.D.A.'s Second Century: Judicial Review,
Politics, and a Diminished Legacy ofExpertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939,979 (2008).
49 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40.
50 Id. at 842. If Congress has granted authority to an agency to "elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation ... [, s]uch regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 843-44.
" Id. at 843.52 id.
53 id.
- O'Reilly, supra note 28, at 941-42.
5 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207 (2006).
56 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
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fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress."5 Justice Breyer,
meanwhile, advocated a return to Skidmore s-type analysis in cases in
which Congress did not impliedly or expressly grant authority, 5 arguing
that courts "may pay particular attention to the views of an expert agency
where they represent 'specialized experience."' 60 It appears that the
question of whether Chevron will remain the major controlling case on
issues of statutory interpretation by agencies has not been conclusively
answered, 61 but Justice Breyer's position that Chevron is an outgrowth of
Skidmore is becoming more popular with the court.62
C. Congressional Acquiescence
When considerable evidence exists that Congress has acquiesced to
an agency interpretation, that interpretation must stand.63 The 9 th Circuit
has long held that Congressional acquiescence is difficult to show.
Acquiescence can only be shown if the administrative interpretation is "of
long standing, and ... well-established in administrative practice."' In
Bob Jones University v. U.S.,65  the Supreme Court held that
Congressional acquiescence can come in the form of hearings and votes
on the issue that tend to uphold the agency's view. 66 However, "[a]bsent
such overwhelming evidence of acquiescence, [the court is] loath to
replace the plain text and original understanding of a statute with an
" Id. at 591.
58 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
s9 Skidmore., 323 U.S. at 139 (holding that courts should defer to agency interpretations
even when "they do not constitute an exercise of delegated lawmaking authority."
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139)).
60 Christensen 529 U.S. at 596 (quoting Skidmore 323 U.S. at 139).
61 See Sunstein, supra note 37.
62 See U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (holding that the court should look to "the
degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency's position," regardless of whether Congress intended for the
agency to have interpretative authority, as is an important factor in Chevron analysis).
6 3 Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 537 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008).
6 Maun v. U.S., 347 F.2d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 1965).6 461 U.S. 574 ( 9 1h Cir. 1983).66 d. at 168-69.
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amended agency interpretation."6 Mere Congressional inaction in the face
of a regulation, therefore, is not enough,68 but it is not always clear how
much evidence is necessary to find Congressional consent. 69
In Rapanos v. U.S., the Supreme Court held that an Army Corps of
Engineers' interpretation of a CWA provision protecting "navigable
waters" was too broad.70 In response to the argument that Congress
acquiesced to the interpretation, Scalia wrote for the majority, "[w]hat the
dissent refers to as 'Congress' deliberate acquiscence' should more
appropriately be called Congress's failure to express any opinion."7' In
seeming contradiction with the Bob Jones case, the majority here held that
only legislative action reinforcing administrative interpretation is enough
to find Congressional acquiescence. 72
The major issue decided in the instant case was whether Congress
had acquiesced to the regulation in question.73 The court addressed the
issues of Rapanos in greater detail, examining every law passed by
Congress since the promulgation of the regulation in question that might
be a sign of acquiescence. If there is a novel legal aspect to this decision, it
is in its reaffirmation and perhaps even strengthening of Scalia's basic
conclusion in Rapanos that "the standard for a judicial review of
congressional acquiescence is extremely high." 74
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The defendant brought several issues to the 9 th Circuit's attention
on appeal. The court held that (1) it did not have original jurisdiction, and
67 Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 595).
Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 749 (2006); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference
andDemocracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 761, 796 (2007).
69 See Bressman, supra note 48. Bressman argues that the quantity of evidence necessary
to find acquiescence is fact-dependant. Id.
70 547 U.S. 715, 737 (2006).
7 Id. at 750.72 Id. While acknowledging that the court sometimes found acquiescence without
legislative action, the court argued that the overwhelming evidence necessary to do so
was not present here. Id.
n Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 537 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9h Cir. 2008).
74 Id.
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thus the district court's jurisdiction was proper, (2) that the statute of
limitations had not expired because it did not start running until the
plaintiffs' petition to the EPA was denied,76 (3) that the plaintiffs
challenged all exemptions in the regulation that ran counter to the
statute, (4) that the regulation clearly ran counter to the intent of the
legislature and that (5) Congress did not acquiesce to the regulation
simply through inaction.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The court first addressed the issue of whether any statute removed
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction in this case8 0 . At the urging
of the defendants, the court concentrated on section 509(b)(1) of the
CWA, which specified two categories of agency action that would result
in original jurisdiction for the 9t Circuit if they applied in this instance,
and addressed them in turn.8 1 The court found that the first category,
1369(b)(1)(E), did not apply because, while it did provide original
jurisdiction for any EPA act backing numerical limitations on the CWA,
the regulation in question did not fall into that category. 82 The regulation
does not involve limitations, rather it fashions exemptions from the
CWA's limitations on discharging pollutants. 83
The second section the court examined was 509(b)(1)(F). This
provision allowed the 9 th Circuit original jurisdiction in cases involving
the issuance or denial of permits for discharging pollutants. In its analysis,
the court points out that prior decisions had narrowly tailored this
" Id. at 1015.
76 Id. at 1019.
1 Id. at 1020.
78 Id. at 1023.
9 Id. at 1024.
so It should be noted that this question was largely academic. The plaintiffs had filed a
complaint directly to the 9 1h Circuit in addition to the complaint filed to the district court
in case the 9h Circuit found that it had original jurisdiction. Id at 1014.
8' Id. at 1015.
82 Id. at 1017.
83 id.
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provision. 84 Unless the case involves a specific instance of the EPA
granting or denying a permit, this statute cannot be used to obtain original
jurisdiction in the court of appeals.85 The court pointed out that whenever
it had used these statutes in the past to obtain original jurisdiction, it had
done so on the basis of explicit provisions giving it that right." In the
instant case, because the regulation specifically exempted the pollutants in
question from regulation, there would never be a case involving the
issuance or denial of a permit.87 The court concluded that the statute in
question did not allow for original jurisdiction.
B. Statute ofLimitations
The court next addressed the issue of whether the statute of
limitations had run on the current action. Its analysis hinged on whether
the cause of action was first available when the regulation was
promulgated or in 2003 when the EPA ruled on the petition.88 This
question had already been duly ruled upon.89 In previous decisions, the
court had held that the statute of limitations begins to run after a ruling is
made on a petition or request.90 Because this case was indistinguishable
from previous cases, the court concluded that the suit had been filed in a
timely manner. 91
C. Ultra Vires Challenge
The court then began its analysis of the merits of the plaintiffs'
case. The court proposed that if the plaintiffs were correct that the
regulation in question exceeded the statutory jurisdiction of the EPA, then
* Id.
8 Id.
" Id. at 1017-18.8 7 Id. at 1018. (citing Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 266 F. Supp.2d 1101,
1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2003).88 id
89 id.
9 Id. (citing Wind River Mining Corp. v. U.S., 946 F.2d 710, 716 (9 Cir. 1991).
9' Id. at 1019.
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it would be invalid. 92 The court applied the Chevron test to decide
whether the regulation was ultra vires in nature. 93 The court first disposed
of the defendants' arguments in turn. The EPA asserted first that the
plaintiffs had only challenged the portion of the regulation dealing with
ballast water in their petition, and should have been limited to challenging
that portion at trial.9 The court held that while the plaintiffs had always
concentrated on the ballast water discharges, they had challenged all three
exemptions that they claimed violated the CWA in their petition. 95
The court next turned to the Chevron analysis. The
defendants disputed the plaintiffs' claim that the regulation contradicted
the plain meaning of the statute. The court quickly disposed of this
argument, asserting that the text of the CWA was clear on the issue of
permits. It clearly required permits for all discharged pollutants, the court
concluded. 96 The court looked to the definition of pollutant, which
included "biological materials." 97 The court read "biological materials" to
include the invasive species often released with ballast water. 98 The court
finally referenced a D.C. Circuit case that had held that the EPA could
decide whether to issue permits, but could not decide to exempt pollutants
entirely from requiring permits to discharge. 99 The court agreed that the
D.C. case was "dispositive of our case."10 It concluded that because the
plain intent of the statute was to require permits for all discharges of
pollution, the regulation was outside the authority of the EPA to
promulgate.






96 Id. at 1021. (citing Comm. To Save Mokelumne River v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13
F.3d 305, 309 (9 h Cir. 1993)).
9 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (8).
98 Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1021.
99 Id. (citing NaturalRes. Def Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
'" Id.
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The court next took up the issue of whether Congress had
acquiesced to the EPA's interpretation of § 122.3(a) of the CWA. The
judges first noted that the standard of review, as set out in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159 (2001), is difficult to overcome.o1 The court noted that only
when the interpretation of the statute is obviously correct, and when there
is extensive legislative history evidencing Congress' intent, can their
acquiescence be implied.102 It relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
previous decisions in Bob Jones and Rajanos that congressional
acquiescence is extremely difficult to prove.1 The court acknowledged
the EPA's contention that several post-1973 statutes pointed to Congress'
knowledge of the regulation and perhaps even its unwillingness to
overturn it, but asserted that the statutes, while evidence that Congress
knew of the regulation at issue, did not evidence its acquiescence.104 First,
the court ruled that the fact that Congress had made legislation exempting
certain military vessels from compliance with the CWA did not evidence
its acquiescence with the regulation. 05 The court pointed to legislative
history showing Congress' concern with state, not federal, regulations that
led them to pass this law. 106 Although Congress acknowledged the
presence of § 122.3(a), it never cited it approvingly. Another statute
referenced by the defendants extended the CWA to vessels engaged in
certain mining and drilling operations even when beyond its traditional
scope.' 0 7 The court noted that because Congress never explicitly approved
of the EPA's decision to exempt certain vessels from the permit
requirement, this law did not evidence acquiescence. 08
The court also acknowledged the EPA's argument that several
statutes Congress passed regulating the discharge of pollutants exempted
o Id. at 1022.
10 2 Id. (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. US., 461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983)).
103 Id.
'" Id. at 1023.
05 Id. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 exempted "discharges incidental
to the normal operation of United States military vessels from CWA permitting
requirements..." Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) (1996)).
1 
at id.
1o7 Id. at 1024.
1o8 id.
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by the regulation evidenced its intent to leave the regulation in place.109
The court noted that Congress had passed several laws limiting the
discharging of certain pollutants, but that all of the statutes cited by the
defense explicitly stated that they would only supplement, not "amend [or]
repeal any other provision of law."" 0 The court held that because the
overwhelming evidence of Congressional acquiescence required by the
Northern Cook County case was not present here, it had to rule in favor of
the plaintiffs."'
V. COMMENT
It is unclear at this time whether this decision will have a wide-
ranging impact on ballast water pollution. Future Congressional action
will most likely have a much more prominent effect on whether ballast
water will be regulated more stringently in the future. Most of this court's
impact on the ballast water debate will most likely be felt in the near
future, before Congress has had the opportunity to act. It may also
influence Congress to take action on an issue that it has long ignored.
A. Legal Analysis
That said, the court's conclusion that the regulation was ultra vires
is certainly correct. There is no exception in the CWA permit requirements
for ballast water, and for the EPA to create one through the promulgation
of ultra vires regulation is inappropriate. In coming to its decision, the
court did not stray from existing precedent - if anything, it strengthened it
- and, on the crucial question of whether the regulation went beyond the
statutory jurisdiction of the EPA, correctly applied the Chevron test. The
dispositive issue was whether the term "biological materials" included
invasive species released in ballast water. Because the definition
accompanying the statute does specifically include "biological materials"
as pollutants, the court's decision was not a difficult one.112
1' Id.
"
0 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1907(f)).
"I Id.
112 Northwest Envtl. Advocates at 1021.
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The issue of congressional acquiescence, however, was closer.
While the court correctly applied a high standard on this matter, it is
unclear whether Congress actually did not acquiesce. The court relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones University v.
United States that "[a]bsent ... overwhelming evidence of acquiescence,
we are loath to replace the plain text and original understanding of a
statute with an amended agency interpretation." 3 In that case, the court
referenced repeated congressional refusal to overturn an IRS regulation as
evidence of acquiescence. 114
In the present case similar evidence should have been apparent.
Even as the appeals court handed down its decision, Congress was (and is)
in the process of passing new legislation that would cement the Coast
Guard's authority over ballast water reulation, and explicitly uphold the
EPA's continued refusal to regulate it. 1 Perhaps the court was unaware
of congressional action because it has occurred relatively recently and was
not referenced in any presented briefs, but if it was aware, the court at
least should have acknowledged its presence. Even if it had, however, it's
very possible the court still would have held that congressional action on a
bill that has not yet been voted on in the Senate did not meet the standard
for congressional acquiescence. It certainly was weaker than the evidence
in Bob Jones. Given that, though its decision to find a lack of
congressional acquiescence should have been more deeply analyzed, the
court made the right decision.
B. The Future ofBallast Water Regulation: The Coast Guard?
In the wake of the decision, the EPA has put forward proposals for
new regulations on ballast water discharge in U.S. waters. Future EPA
permits would probably only require ships to flush their ballast tanks with
saltwater before entering U.S. waters, a practice already required by Coast
11 461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983).
114 id.
"5 H.R. 2830, 1 10k" Cong. (2008). The resolution, which passed the House by an
overwhelming margin and is also likely to pass the Senate, upholds the regulation in its
current form.
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Guard regulations."16 According to some environmental advocates, "the
EPA has put forward a weak permit that will not fully protect the Great
Lakes or other U.S. waters from the threat of aquatic invasive species." "7
Regardless, future ballast water regulation may be out of the
EPA's hands. Congress is currently in the process of passing the Ballast
Water Treatment Act of 2008. "' That bill would require ocean vessels
coming into any U.S. port to install treatment technology to clean ballast
water before its discharge.'" 9 The bill has been met with mixed reviews
from environmental advocates. For one thing, the bill in its current form
would only require the shipping industry to install cleaning technology
several years down the road, not immediately as the situation likely
demands.120 The bill in its current form would also limit the ability of state
and local governments to apply more stringent regulations to ballast water
discharge. 121 This would have the most prominent effect on the Great
Lakes states, many of which already have their own ballast water laws.122
Despite these concerns, many environmental advocates and
Congressional leaders have stated their support for the legislation, which
would eventually require technological improvements to stem the
environmental impact of ballast water discharges. Should the bill pass the
Senate and be signed into law, one thing is clear: The impact of the 9 th
Circuit's decision in Northwest Environmental Advocates on ballast water
regulation will be nullified. Its future effect will probably be limited to its
reaffirmation and perhaps even strengthening of the high standard of
evidence required to find congressional acquiescence.
VI. CONCLUSION
116 d
117 Healing Our Waters-Great Lakes Coalition, July 23, 2008, available at
http://www.glin.net/lists/glin-announce/2008-07/msgOO053.html.
" H.R. 2830, 110th Cong. (2008).
119 Northwest Environmental Advocates v. U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL APPEALS COURT
BLGG, July 24 2008, http://environmentalappealscourt.blogspot.com/2008/07/northwest-
environmental-advocates-v-us.html.
120 Egan, supra note 7.
121 Id.
122 Karen Shapiro, Keep State Control, Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, May 3 2008,
available at http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=746426.
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The court's decision to apply the CWA permit requirement to
ballast water discharges is the correct one. It upholds the will of the
legislature as codified in the law and beats back regulatory attempts to
blunt the impact of environmental regulation. The decision now lies with
Congress, as it should, as to whether it wishes to keep the CWA as it
currently stands and require EPA permits for ballast water regulation. Any
Congressional attempt to dull the impact of the court's decision will surely
be met with an outcry from the environmentalist community and with
applause from the shipping coalition. Congress should ignore reactions
from both sides to come up with a sensible new policy that protects
American waters by requiring swift action from the shipping industry
while nullifying the certain economic impact of such actions. Easier said
than done.
ROBERT A. NOCE
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